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Abstract 
This paper describes the research conducted into 
advanced authorization infrastructures at the National 
e-Science Centre (NeSC) at the University of Glasgow 
and their application to support a teaching 
environment as part of the Dynamic Virtual 
Organisations in e-Science Education (DyVOSE) 
project. We outline the lessons learnt in teaching Grid 
computing and rolling out the associated security 
authorisation infrastructures, and describe our plans 
for a future, extended security infrastructure for 
dynamic establishment of inter-institutional virtual 
organisations (VO) in the education domain. 
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1. Introduction 
As Grid technology becomes ubiquitous across a wide 
range of application domains, there is an increasing 
demand for proven and effective security models and 
infrastructures. This can only be achieved if there is a 
generation of developers cognisant of the challenges 
and solutions that exists in the technologies underlying 
the Grid. Knowledge transfer and exposure to leading 
Grid solutions is thus essential for next generation 
middleware developers. In the current fluid 
middleware environment, it is especially difficult for 
educators to produce course materials that will have 
some kind of longevity and incorporate latest Grid 
developments. 
To meet this challenge there is a need for courses 
that cover the fundamental principles of Grid 
computing in conjunction with exploration of today’s 
solutions. Thus whilst there might be numerous 
technologies say for job scheduling (e.g. Condor [1], 
Sun Grid Engine [2], OpenPBS [3], Maui [4]), the 
basic principles of job scheduling and the specific 
demands of large scale, wide area job scheduling 
remain the same. The NeSC at the University of 
Glasgow has established a Grid Computing module as 
part of the advanced MSc in Computing Science 
addressing these challenges. This is one of the first full 
Grid computing courses available today. 
Security is one area where education is critical to 
the future acceptance and take-up of the Grid, and has 
been a key aspect of the Grid Computing module at 
Glasgow. Understanding the technical and non-
technical aspects associated with security is crucial, 
not least due to the degree of trust between resource 
providers and the potentially highly distributed, 
remote end users. For the most part, the Grid 
community has focused primarily upon authentication 
– verifying that users are who they say they are. This 
has largely been implemented using Public Key 
Infrastructures (PKIs) [5]. Through PKIs, it is possible 
to validate the identity of a given user requesting 
access to a given resource. For example, with the 
Globus toolkit solution [6], gatekeepers are used to 
ensure that signed requests are valid, i.e. from known 
collaborators. When this is so, i.e. the Distinguished 
Name (DN) of the requestor is in a locally stored and 
managed gridmap file, the user is typically given 
access to local account as defined in the gridmap file.  
There are several key limitations with this approach 
with regard to security. For example, the level of 
granularity of security is limited. There is no mention 
of what the user is allowed to do once they have 
gained access to the resource. Further, this approach 
works on the assumption that user certificates are 
provided by an acknowledged certificate authority 
(CA). In the UK, a centrally managed CA at 
Rutherford Appleton Laboratories exists [7] which 
(necessarily) has strict procedures for how certificates 
are allocated. Users are expected to “prove” who they 
are in order to get a certificate, e.g. through presenting 
their passports to a trusted individual at their 
institution (contacted by the CA). This is a human 
intensive activity and one which has scalability issues 
once it is rolled out to the wider community, e.g. to 
industry and larger groups such as students taking 
Grid/e-Science courses. Having users personally take 
care of their private keys is another major limitation of 
this approach. The passwords associated with these 
private keys are necessarily strong, and as a 
consequence users are liable to write them down, 
thereby seriously compromising the overall Grid 
security.   
In short, current experiences with PKIs as the 
mechanism for ensuring security on the Grid have not 
been too successful [8,9]. Whilst being a widely 
accepted foundation for security, authentication on its 
own is insufficient for fine grained control. 
Authorisation – defining and enforcing what end users 
are allowed to do on local resources – is essential. 
Authorisation infrastructures offer extended and finer 
grained security control when accessing and using 
Grid resources. Many authorisation solutions exist 
today, often using different paradigms of operation 
[10-13]. Examples of how these compare to one 
another are described in [14-16].  
It is clear that defining and managing detailed 
policies on access to and usage of site resources will 
face scalability issues for large scale Grid 
infrastructures where many different users, services 
and resources exist. This is further compounded when 
new users join, leave, new resources are added and 
removed etc. Having a single centralised authority to 
manage a security infrastructure at a given site is not 
realistic for large scale, evolving Grid infrastructures. 
Instead dynamic (rather than static) delegation of 
authority is required. Static delegation of authority 
implies that a central authority has to be contacted, 
and register local managers in its policy, before 
managers are entitled to assign privileges to 
subordinates. With dynamic delegation of authority, 
however, local managers do not need to be registered, 
but are given the privilege to delegate when they are 
first given privileges to use the system. Managers can 
then allocate privileges to staff and students as 
required, without having to contact the central 
authority first to get permission. Through this, a 
federated and scalable model of security authorisation 
can be realised. The DyVOSE project [17] has 
developed a dynamic delegation issuing service which 
supports such dynamic delegation of authority. Given 
the novelty of this security solution, large scale 
practical explorations of such extended authorisation 
infrastructures in realistic environments such as 
education are essential.  
We note that these security models and solutions are 
broadly applicable across most Grids today, not just 
education, since they address the key challenge of 
dynamically linking collections of distributed 
individuals and resources together in a secure manner 
to form so called Virtual Organisations (VOs). 
Typically a VO will allow a collection of individuals 
and/or institutions to pool resources such as data sets, 
data archives, CPUs, or allow access to specialised 
equipment from astronomical radio-telescopes through 
to medical imaging scanners. With the open and 
collaborative nature of the Grid, ensuring that local 
security constraints are met and not weakened by Grid 
security solutions is paramount. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the Grid Computing 
module contents and a justification for, and 
exploration of, the course structure. Section 3 provides 
an outline of existing authorisation infrastructures and 
describes in detail the PERMIS role based access 
control software used in teaching at Glasgow. Section 
4 explores the experiences in applying these security 
infrastructures in a teaching environment and section 5 
outlines the lessons learnt and plans for the future. 
 
2. Grid Computing Module Composition 
The Grid Computing module at the University of 
Glasgow was designed specifically to train future Grid 
engineers. One of the greatest challenges we faced in 
developing and delivering materials for educating 
future Grid engineers was (is!) the fluidity of the 
technological landscape. Grid technology and 
associated standards are continually evolving in a 
radical manner with new recommendations and 
software from standards bodies and solutions 
providers. This has been exemplified in recent times 
with the move from pre-web service based Grid 
infrastructures [18,19] to Open Grid Service 
Infrastructure (OGSI) based Grid services [20] and the 
current move towards Web Service Resource 
Framework (WSRF) web/Grid services [21]. The 
evolution of the Open Grid Service Architecture 
(OGSA) is also a key issue that makes the 
development and delivery of any form of education or 
materials difficult. Trainers and educators need to be 
sure that they are developing materials which has 
some expectancy of life time. Developing and 
delivering educational materials based upon explicit 
technology, e.g. Globus toolkit version 3, are fraught 
with dangers associated with a moving technology 
base. The nature of the Grid computing module at 
Glasgow was explicitly designed with these issues in 
mind. The overall structure of the Grid Computing 
module is given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Grid Computing module contents 
 
This course structure was designed to give an 
overall impression of the key challenges and 
distinguishing characteristics of Grid computing. 
Linkage to previous work and architectures in 
distributed computing, and more recent activities such 
as peer to peer systems was deliberately undertaken to 
put Grid computing into perspective. It is a fact that 
many of the concepts associated with Grid computing 
are a refactoring of previous distributed systems ideas. 
Where Grid computing differs however is in scale, e.g. 
managing peta-bytes of data poses new computing 
science research challenges. Open challenges and 
unsolved issues such as long term data curation and 
data provenance were outlined in the course to give 
the students an awareness of research frontiers. 
Establishing a course based solely upon principles 
and challenges associated with Grid technologies, is 
Wk 1  Lecture 1  Introduction to Grid Computing  
   Lecture 2  Scalability and Heterogeneity  
Wk 2  Tutorial 1  Discussion of seminal Grid papers  
   Lecture 3  Open standards and architectures  
   Lecture 4  Implementations of Grid architecture  
Wk 3  Lecture 5  Web services  
   Lecture 6  Resource discovery and info. services  
   Tutorial 2  Exploring web services with GT3  
Wk 4  Lecture 7  Grid security concepts  
   Lecture 8  Virtual organizations  
   Lecture 9  Security in practise  
Wk 5  Tutorial 3  Review of Grid security papers/Lab  
   Lecture 10  Job scheduling and management  
   Lecture 11  Job scheduling and management  
Wk 6  Tutorial 4  Review of job scheduling papers  
   Lecture 12  Workflow management  
   Tutorial 5  Q&A on programming exercise  
Wk 7  Lecture 13  Data access, integration and mgt  
   Lecture 14  Data provenance and curation  
   Tutorial 6  Review of data mgt/provenance  
Wk 8  Lecture 15  Bulk Data Transfer  
   Lecture 16  Peer-to-peer communication  
   Tutorial 7  Discussion of networking papers  
Wk 9  Lecture 17  Tools for Collaboration  
   Tutorial 8  Discussion on future of Grid  
   Lecture 18  The future of Grid Computing  
Wk 10  Lecture 19  Sample applications  
   Lecture 20  Review of major concepts  
unlikely to be suitable for a full time advanced course. 
Experiments and investigations using current state of 
the art in Grid technology are needed. At Glasgow this 
was through use of OGSI versions of the Globus 
toolkit [21] and Condor [1] (amongst other 
technologies), however, we emphasise that this 
technology did not provide the cornerstone of the 
educational material. Rather it provided a vehicle 
through which many of the basic principles could be 
demonstrated. It is this perspective we believe that 
underpins the difference between training and 
education more generally. Courses designed to train e-
Scientists would have radically different 
characteristics and be more focused upon how to use 
existing technologies.  
A key requirement on Grid education is a broad 
scope and balance. Grid technology touches on many 
areas from security, usability, job scheduling and data 
management etc and developing single courses 
attempting to provide a complete picture of Grid today 
needs to be targeted to the right audience. Whilst high 
level overviews of Grid can be provided say to 
undergraduate students, it is more likely the case that 
complete and detailed overview materials are best 
delivered to computer science students that have the 
necessary grounding in related materials. At Glasgow, 
various pre-requisites were in place for students 
wishing to take the Grid Computing module. Students 
were expected to either have taken various courses at 
Glasgow such as advanced networking systems, 
operating systems, distributed systems and algorithms 
etc, or have knowledge of the contents of these 
courses. This impacted upon the level of difficulty of 
the programming assignments which were developed 
to test advanced and knowledgeable computer 
scientists, as opposed to less experienced (novice) 
undergraduate students. That said the lecture material 
(as opposed to the implementation work) is more 
generic in nature and will we hope be more easily 
transferable to the wider community. Several sites 
have requested permission to re-use these teaching 
materials which we have granted. 
It is also worth noting the strong emphasis on 
security in this course both in terms of lecture material 
and implementation/assignment work. The lectures on 
security provided an overview of the challenges of 
making Grids secure including concepts such as 
authentication, authorisation, accounting, auditing, 
confidentiality, privacy, data integrity, and trust. 
Exploration of current Grid security mechanisms, e.g. 
PKI based authentication and Globus GSI [6] based 
individual service/user based authorisation was 
presented, with focus on the many open challenges to 
be addressed to realise robust, scalable Grid security. 
Lectures addressing other aspects of Grid Computing 
were delivered in a similar manner, each with an 
emphasis on their own idiosyncratic issues. The 
structure of the Grid computing course itself and the 
lecture materials, associated background reading and 
tutorials on setting up secure Grid infrastructures for 
teaching purposes are available at [17].  
We also felt that it was important to emphasise real 
working Grid solutions in a variety of application 
domains. Live demonstrations of significant Grids 
were presented to the students in later lectures – 
showing how real science is undertaken on large scale 
compute and data Grid infrastructures. We focused in 
particular on the life science domain [23] but outlined 
solutions from a wide variety of other domains such as 
nano-engineering and particle physics. 
The module itself was assessed by a combination of 
a written examination (70%) and marked coursework 
(30%). The marked coursework consisted of three 
smaller problem sets and one large programming 
assignment. This course has been run one time thus far 
and it is planned that it will be repeated in early 2006. 
Sixteen students took the course the first time around 
– a significant amount for an elective module held for 
the first time. The infrastructure used in the course of 
the teaching consisted of a training laboratory at the 
NeSC at University of Glasgow comprising 20 PCs – 
each with Pentium III processors with 512MB RAM. 
Each PC had the associated technologies (Condor, 
Globus, etc) preinstalled and configured for students.  
 
3. Background to Advanced 
Authorisation Infrastructures 
In a Grid environment, authentication (being able to 
establish the identity of a user) should be augmented 
with authorisation capabilities, which can be 
considered as what Grid users are allowed to do on a 
given Grid end-system. Thus “what users are allowed 
to do” can be interpreted as the privileges that the 
users have been allocated on those end-systems. The 
X.509 standard [24] has standardised the certificates 
of a PMI. A PMI can be considered as being related to 
authorisation in much the same way as a PKI is related 
to authentication. Consequently, there are many 
similar concepts in PKIs and PMIs. An outline of 
these concepts and their relationship are discussed in 
detail in [25].  
The Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure 
Standards Validation (PERMIS) project [26] was an 
EC project that built an authorisation infrastructure to 
realise a scalable X.509 attribute certificate (AC) 
based PMI. Through PERMIS, an alternative and 
more scalable approach to centrally allocated X.509 
public key certificates can be achieved through the 
issuance of locally allocated X.509 ACs. The PERMIS 
software realises a Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) authorisation infrastructure. It offers a 
standards-based Java API that allows developers of 
resource gateways (gatekeepers) to enquire if a 
particular access to a resource should be allowed. In 
addition, PERMIS realises the generic Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [27] AuthZ API 
[28] put forward by the Global Grid Forum [29]. This 
API provides a generic policy enforcement point 
(PEP) that can be associated with an arbitrary 
authorisation infrastructure. Thus rather than 
developers having to explicitly engineer a security 
policy checks on a per application basis, the 
information contained within the deployment 
descriptor file (.wsdd) when the service is deployed 
within the container, is used. Authorisation checks on 
users attempting to invoke “methods” associated with 
a given service are then made using the information in 
the .wsdd file and the digitally signed (and tamper 
proof!) security policies defined and stored within the 
LDAP repository (Policy Decision Point (PDP) in 
X.509 parlance) together with the DN of the user. 
Note that this “method” authorisation basis extends 
current security mechanisms such as GSI which work 
on a per service/container basis. The Globus toolkit 
(version GT3.3+) and PERMIS both support this API.  
The PERMIS RBAC system itself uses XML based 
policies defining rules, specifying which access 
control decisions are to be made for given VO 
resources. These rules include definitions of: subjects 
that can be assigned roles (students, staff etc); Source 
of Authority (SOA), e.g. local managers trusted to 
assign roles to subjects; roles and their hierarchical 
relationships; what roles can be assigned to which 
subjects by which SOAs; target resources, and the 
actions that can be applied to them; which roles are 
allowed to perform which actions on which targets, 
and the conditions under which access can be granted 
to roles. Roles are assigned to subjects by issuing them 
with X.509 Attribute Certificate(s). A graphical tool 
called the Privilege Allocator (PA) has been developed 
to support this process. Once roles are assigned, and 
policies developed, they are digitally signed by a 
manager and stored in one or more LDAP repositories.  
To set up and administer PERMIS requires the use 
of a LDAP server to store the attribute certificates and 
reference the SOA root certificate. A local CA is 
required to be set up – at Glasgow we used OpenSSL 
[30] – this designates the SOA and all user certificates 
created from this CA must have a Distinguished Name 
that matches the structure of the LDAP server. The 
DN of the user certificate is what is used to identify 
the client making the call on the Grid service. From 
the user’s perspective, once the administrator has set 
up the infrastructure, the PERMIS service is relatively 
easy to use. Unique identifiers are placed as 
parameters into the user’s grid service deployment 
descriptor (.wsdd file). These are the Object 
Identification number of the policy in the repository, 
the URI of the LDAP server where the policies are 
held and the SOA associated with the policy being 
implemented. Once these parameters are input and the 
service is deployed, the user creates a proxy certificate 
with the user certificate created by the local CA to 
perform strong authentication. The client is run and 
the authorisation process allows or refuses the 
intended action in a generic and transparent manner. 
 
4. Exploration of the Advanced Security 
Infrastructure 
In exploring the advanced security infrastructure, 
the students were initially expected to develop their 
own security policies (in the second problem 
assignment set) for a basic GT3.3 based Grid service 
which was subsequently used in their main 
programming assignment.  
Specifically the students were requested to create a 
policy for a GT3.3 service (searchSortGridService) 
which wrapped a Condor based application (this 
service offered two methods to search (searchMethod) 
and sort (sortMethod) a large (5MB) text file (the 
complete works of Shakespeare). The students 
themselves were split into groups (studentteam1, 
studentteam2) with the authorisation policy to ensure 
that method sortMethod could only be invoked by 
members of their student group and the lecturing staff, 
whilst method searchMethod could be invoked by 
everyone.  This set-up was used to illustrate the use of 
RBAC, where users are allocated privileges based on 
what role they have been assigned rather than their 
local user credentials. The students were also 
requested to secure their service using Globus GSI 
(which provides service based security) and also with 
PERMIS (which uses finer grained based method level 
security). Performance aspects and benchmarks for the 
speed of the different systems were recorded by the 
students.   
The intention of this assignment was multi-fold. We 
wanted to: undertake a detailed exploration of the 
PERMIS tool family (including the Policy Editor and 
the Privilege Allocator; explore in detail and document 
the usability of the GGF AuthZ SAML interface; take 
the students through a trivial Java programming 
exercise through to addressing the challenges of 
developing and deploying applications across a Grid 
infrastructure; gain an appreciation of the performance 
aspects when Grid middleware and associated security 
infrastructures are used. 
Students could implement this system any way that 
they chose and a variety of search and sort methods 
were implemented – we deliberately told the students 
that we did not care how performant their 
implementations for search/sort were. Rather we were 
more interested in the performance impact of the Grid 
middleware on their implemented algorithms and their 
experiences of Grid technologies as a whole.  
 
4.1 Observations and Feedback 
Considerable feedback was generated on the general 
usability of the PERMIS policy editing tools which 
was subsequently sent to the PERMIS team (and has 
since been incorporated into their later releases). All 
students were able to create security policies using 
these tools however some students suggested that the 
HCI aspects of the tool (explicitly coded to be suited 
to non-computer literate folk) should be removed. This 
was counter to the HCI expert suggestions which had 
been incorporated into the tools’ user interface on 
making them easier to use!  
Most students were also able to develop the Condor 
based version of their search/sort system. A variety of 
solutions were implemented using Condor. Some 
students allowed the user to select how many nodes 
the job should be distributed over. Other students 
farmed out the data with the jobs whilst others came 
up with solutions whereby the data was pre-deployed.  
However of the 16 students that took this module 
only four managed to successfully engineer the Globus 
GT3.3 based version which wrapped the Condor 
version of their search/sort system. Of these four, two 
managed to get the PERMIS based solution working, 
whilst all four managed to get the GSI version 
working. It has to be said however that the students at 
Glasgow had significantly different levels of 
programming ability and experience of associated 
background technologies. The overall performance 
aspects of the different implementations are presented 
in table 2. 
 
Search (s) Sort (s) 
Single Processor 1.7 + 0.4 5.7 + 3.3 
Condor Pool (16 nodes) 62.2 + 4.4 60.7 + 3.1 
Condor Pool (4 nodes) 29.5 + 6.9 35.2 + 1.8 
Grid Service (4 nodes) 31.8 + 5.9 37.6 + 11.2 
GSI (4 nodes) 39.9 + 8.6 48.3 + 15.3 
PERMIS (4 nodes)  34.5 + 8.6 38.5 + 9.8 
Table 2: Job Completion Times 
As may be seen it was far quicker to search and sort 
the file on a single PC. The overheads in distributing 
the sort/search algorithms were significant and 
typically resulted in taking over one minute to search 
and to sort the file using all of the nodes in the pool. 
The reasons for this are primarily due to the overheads 
involved in farming out the jobs across a network and 
collecting and merging the results. The time taken to 
split the text files, traverse the local network, prepare 
the Condor jobs, process them, come back to the 
original machine and concatenate the final results gave 
a significant time overhead.  
A further key factor in the performance is due to the 
job being completed when all distributed Condor jobs 
have completed, i.e. one queued or delayed job delays 
the overall time. Other issues that contributed were the 
high network latency and non-deterministic nature of 
benchmarking on a multi-user system. The extent of 
the delays caused by these issues was nevertheless 
surprising. 
The GSI-based authorisation of the application also 
resulted in a significant increase in the overall time 
required to complete the search/sort (approximately 8 
seconds). The PERMIS based authorisation of the 
search/sort application took approximately 3 seconds 
more than the unsecured service. The reasons for these 
increases, compared to the unsecured service, are due 
to the time overhead in consulting the gridmap file 
and the LDAP repository, respectively, then 
proceeding through the necessary stages of credential 
validation.  Once again the time overheads were 
surprising. 
Of the students that managed to complete the full 
exercise, numerous observations on the state of the 
Grid middleware were made. Many of these were not 
especially positive. For example, in other courses at 
Glasgow students were asked to implement much 
more complicated distributed systems using Java RMI, 
and were quite scathing about how complicated Grid 
middleware is to use to implement such a seemingly 
basic distributed application.  
The lack of programming environments and 
debuggers was also identified. Students often resorted 
to using web search engines for debugging purposes as 
opposed to middleware documentation.  More often 
than not, students identified that the result sets 
returned from such searches contained other users who 
had faced similar problems with no answers being 
found. We note that leaving these students to resolve 
these issues largely by themselves was deliberate. This 
was an advanced computing course where we 
expected students to solve implementation issues 
themselves. That said it was often the case that direct 
help was necessary when students faced non-
resolvable implementation errors. 
Despite this we note that four students also went on 
to complete their advanced MSc dissertations in Grid 
related research and technologies.  
 
5. Lessons Learnt and Future Work 
One of the main challenges in teaching Grid 
computing we faced is striking a balance between 
what is achievable in terms of implementation and 
what can constitute ground-breaking research. For 
example, linking advanced security and Grid 
infrastructures is still non-trivial and there are 
numerous things that cannot be easily achieved right 
now, e.g. restricting access to subsets of data in 
evolving databases. Establishing the level of difficulty 
of implementation work is also non-trivial and much 
has been learnt in the first running of this course. Thus 
whilst searching and sorting a file is an almost trivial 
computing exercise for a student (never mind an 
advanced student), developing secure Grid services 
utilising Condor pools for searching and sorting 
proved a major challenge to students. For the 
upcoming running of the Grid Computing module we 
thus plan to hold more lab sessions where more hands 
on guidance and exploration of the technologies is 
undertaken. The knowledge base we have now 
established in running the course for the first time 
cannot be emphasised enough. The theory of Grid 
computing and the associated technologies is one 
thing and rolling-out a full advanced course exploring 
toolsets in detail is another. For example, one 
unconsidered issue that arose was in students using the 
same PCs for development. Typically short term (12 
hour) proxy credentials are created by users using their 
own local certificates for Grid development and 
testing. However, when other students later used this 
PC (the PC was not closed down as it formed part of 
the Condor pool) conflicts arose with the existing 
credentials that existed. To resolve this issue, we 
decided that individual students would be allocated 
their own dedicated PCs. Disseminating such 
knowledge to the wider Grid and education 
community is essential for the overall success of Grid 
and e-Science technologies, and something we have 
been actively pursuing for example at e-Science 
education workshops [31]. 
Establishing a static privilege management 
infrastructure for teaching purposes where security 
policies are defined locally in advance and used to 
restrict access to Grid services has been demonstrated, 
and we have seen that this can work. In the wider Grid 
world however, there will typically be many “local” 
security infrastructures each with their own security 
policies. Dynamically linking such infrastructures 
together – as essential in establishing VOs - is the 
focus of the last phase of DyVOSE. A delegation 
issuing service has now been implemented allowing 
local security administrators to delegate privileges to 
remote administrators to issue attribute certificates in a 
controlled manner for access to and usage of local 
resources. Through this, the issues in understanding 
heterogeneous roles, targets and associated actions in a 
distributed setting can be addressed. To explore this 
inter-institutional education scenario, use cases are 
being established with the University of Edinburgh 
where multiple security infrastructures are to be 
dynamically and securely linked.  
 
5.1. Acknowledgements 
The DyVOSE project is funded by a grant from the 
Joint Information System Committee. The authors 
would like to thank the collaborators in the project 
including Professor David Chadwick and Dr Sassa 
Otenko, University of Kent, and Dr Colin Perkins at 
the University of Glasgow. 
 
6. References 
[1] Condor, www.cs.wisc.edu/condor  
[2] Sun Grid Engine, 
http://www.sun.com/software/gridware/index.xml  
[3] Open Portable Batch System (OpenPBS), 
www.openpbs.org  
[4] Maui Cluster Scheduler, 
www.clusterresources.com/products/maui/  
[5] R. Housley, T. Polk, Planning for PKI: Best 
Practices Guide for Deploying Public Key 
Infrastructures, Wiley Computer Publishing, 2001. 
[6] Globus Grid Security Infrastructure, 
http://www.globus.org/security/  
[7] UK Certification Authority, www.grid-
support.ac.uk/  
[8] JISC Authentication, Authorisation and 
Accounting (AAA) Programme Technologies for 
Information Environment Security (TIES), 
http://www.edina.ac.uk/projects/ties/ties_23-9.pdf  
[9] R.O. Sinnott, A.J. Stell, D.W. Chadwick, 
O.Otenko, Experiences of Applying Advanced Grid 
Authorisation Infrastructures, Proceedings of 
European Grid Conference (EGC), pages 265-275, 
Vol. editors: P.M.A. Sloot, et al June 2005, 
Amsterdam, Holland. 
[10] Johnston, W., et al, M. Authorization and 
Attribute Certificates for Widely Distributed Access 
Control, IEEE 7th Int. Workshop on Enabling 
Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative 
Enterprises, June, 1998. 
[11] L Pearlman, et al., A Community Authorisation 
Service for Group Collaboration, Proceedings of IEEE 
3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed 
Systems and Networks. 2002. 
[12] Lepro, R., Cardea: Dynamic Access Control in 
Distributed Systems, NASA Technical Report NAS-
03-020, November 2003. 
[13] D.W.Chadwick, A. Otenko. The PERMIS X.509 
Role Based Privilege Management Infrastructure, Proc 
7th ACM Symposium On Access Control Models And 
Technologies (SACMAT 2002), pp 135-140, 
Monterey, USA, June 2002. 
[14] R.O. Sinnott, A.J. Stell, J. Watt, Comparison of 
Advanced Authorisation Infrastructures for Grid 
Computing, Proceedings of International Conference 
on High Performance Computing Systems and 
Applications, May 2005, Guelph, Canada. 
[15] A.J. Stell, Grid Security: An Evaluation of 
Authorisation Infrastructures for Grid Computing, 
MSc Dissertation, University of Glasgow, 2004. 
[16] D. Chadwick and O. Otenko, A Comparison of 
the Akenti and PERMIS Authorization Infrastructures 
in Ensuring Security in IT Infrastructures, Proceedings 
of the ITI First International Conference on 
Information and Communications Technology (ICICT 
2003) Cairo University, pages 5-26, 2003.  
[17] Dynamic Virtual Organisations for e-Science 
Education (DyVOSE) project, 
www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/dyvose 
[18] UNICORE Forum, www.unicore.org  
[19] Globus toolkit version 2, 
http://www.globus.org/toolkit/downloads/2.4.3/  
[20] Open Grid Service Infrastructure (OGSI) version 
1.0,                     http://www-
unix.globus.org/toolkit/draft-ggf-ogsi-gridservice-
33_2003-06-27.pdf   
[21] Globus toolkit version 3, 
http://www.globus.org/toolkit/downloads/3.0.2/  
[22] Web Service Resource Framework, 
http://www.globus.org/wsrf/  
[23] Biomedical Research Informatics Delivered by 
Grid Enabled Services (BRIDGES) project, 
www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/bridges  
[24] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2001) | ISO/IEC 
9594-8: 2001, Information technology – Open 
Systems Interconnection – Public-Key and Attribute 
Certificate Frameworks. 
[25] D.W.Chadwick, A. Otenko, The PERMIS X.509 
Role Based Privilege Management Infrastructure, 
Future Generation Computer Systems, 936 (2002) 1–
13, December 2002. Elsevier Science BV. 
[26] PERMIS software, http://www.openpermis.org 
[27] OASIS, Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v1.1, 2 
September 2003, http://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/security. 
[28] Authorization Frameworks and Mechanisms WG 
https://forge.gridforum.org/projects/authz-wg  
[29] Global Grid Forum, www.ggf.org  
[30] OpenSSL: The Open Source toolkit for SSL/TLS, 
www.openssl.org  
[31] R.O. Sinnott, Teaching Grid Computing, 
Workshop on Education and Training in UK e-
Science, Edinburgh, November 2004, 
www.nesc.ac.uk/esi/events/487 
 
